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Abstract 
This	 research	work	 proposed,	 developed	 and	 evaluated	 IoT	 Security	 ontology	 for	 smart	 home	
energy	 management	 system	 (SHEMS)	 in	 smart	 grids.	 The	 ontology	 description	 includes	
infrastructure,	attacks,	vulnerabilities	and	counter	measures	for	the	main	components	of	SHEMS	
such	as	Smart	Meter,	Smart	Appliance,	Home	Gateway,	and	Billing	data.	The	ontology	extends	
the	SAREF	energy	management	ontology	with	security	features.	We	have	two	main	reasons	for	
selecting	SAREF	ontology	to	base	our	work	on.	First,	SAREF	is	standardized	by	ETSI.	Second,	it	is	
specifically	designed	for	energy	management	and	efficiency.	We	checked	the	correctness	of	our	
ontology	by	running	SWRL	rules	and	SPARQL	queries.	Our	test	results	showed	that	our	ontology	
is	useful	to	analyse	and	infer	IoT	security	for	smart	home	and	can	be	extended	to	more	complex	
reasoning	of	IoT	security	features. 
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Chapter	1	
1 Introduction	
Internet of things (IoT) is a technology that links objects that are connected to the internet and 
let these objects communicate each other. It includes devices, actuators, sensors, appliances, 
and others connected to the internet [1]. Almost all application domains such as health, 
transport, energy, business, and entertainment are using IoT [2]. Cisco predicted over 50 
billion devices will be connected to the internet in 2020 [3].  
Smart Grid is one of IoT application areas becoming popular and successful. According to 
IHS market prediction, Smart Grid Sensors market will generate $350 billion in 2021 [4] and 
Smart Grid Security will worth $7 billion in 2021 [5]. Smart Grid consists of billions of smart 
objects such as smart appliances, smart meters, actuators, sensors, etc. Even if the adoption of 
IoT devices in Smart Grid is increasing, there are several issues to be addressed. Few of the 
challenges include identifying all objects connected to the internet, interoperability between 
objects, security and privacy of the information flow.  
According to Friess [6] semantic technologies can play a great role on describing, linking and 
reasoning IoT concepts across utilities, enterprises, and applications. The dynamicity of two-
way information flow from IoT devices to the gateway then to the destination from millions 
and billions of heterogeneous devices makes hard to detect the security breaches on real time 
bases. When the infrastructure is sensitive like Smart Grid, the security models and systems 
should estimate and predict contextual changes in their environments, and  adapt their security 
decisions upon those estimates and predictions [7].  This thesis focuses on the use of the 
Semantic Web technologies to develop ontologies to improve the prediction and assessment 
of security of IoT in the Smart Grid. 
Our security ontology has been developed based on the security relationship model described 
in the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-12 [8]. 
1.1 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the smart energy infrastructure, attacks and counter 
measures and from the result of the analysis, build an ontology to improve the prediction and 
assessment of security of IoT in the Smart Grid. To achieve this the main objectives of this 
thesis are as follows:  
• Analyse the requirements of IoT security in Smart Energy Management System. 
• Review available ontologies related to IoT and Security.  
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• Compare the ontologies, select, adopt and extend the selected ontology to our work. 
• Select development tool that is suitable and appropriate for our project. 
• Develop the ontology that incorporates IoT security in Smart Grid. 
• Evaluate the ontology by running queries. 
1.2 Research Challenges  
Most of European countries will replace the traditional Electric Meter to Smart Electric Meter 
in the coming 3-5 years. For example, Norway will replace all traditional Electric Meter to 
Smart Meter in 2019 and Netherland in 2020.  Even if the Adoption of IoT enabled Smart 
Grid is increasing in the last decade, there are several challenges in assuring the Security and 
Privacy of IoT ecosystem in Smart Grid: 
• Several parameters such as the type of network, IoT Environment, Communication 
technologies, etc. need to be considered 
• Millions and billions of small to large heterogeneous objects send and receive data in 
real-time bases. 
• The security mechanism should learn the context of the dynamic environment of IoT. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The structure of the remaining part of the thesis is as follows:  
• Chapter 2 gives the background of IoT and its application, highlights the state of the 
art of Smart Grid and Smart House, and reviews ontologies a solution to IoT 
Interoperability and Security. The chapter also reviews the background of Semantic 
web technologies. 
• Chapter 3 describes the details of the main components of the elected scenarios such 
as Home Energy Management System, Smart Meter, Smart Appliance, and Home 
Gateway from the perspective of IoT Security. The chapter presents the ontology 
architecture. 
• Chapter 4 describes the implementation of the main components of the proposed 
ontology applied to the scenario. The Ontology of the System is developed by 
following Ontology engineering rules. The chapter discusses how our implementation 
has met its objectives by inferencing the Knowledges of the Ontology. 
• Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and points out future work. 
• Chapter 6 presents the Reference Materials used in the thesis. 
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Chapter	Two	
2 Background	and	Literature	Review	
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter has three main parts. The first part reviews the background of Semantic Web 
technologies. The second part describes IoT and its application; Smart Grid and Smart House; 
the technologies used in Smart Grid and Smart house. The last part reviews related works; IoT 
Security, IoT Ontologies and Security Ontologies as shown from figure 2-1 below. Semantic 
web gives brief background and description about Semantic technologies such as Ontology, 
Ontology Language and Ontology development tools. The IoT section describe about the 
definition and application of IoT in Smart Grid and Smart House. The last section of the 
chapter describes about Ontologies related to IoT interoperability and IoT Security. At the end 
of each section we compared the technologies based on selected parameters which helps us in 
selecting the best candidate technologies we used in our paper. 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Structure of State of the Art 
State	of	the	arts
Semantic	Web
OntologyOntology	LanguagesWeb	Ontology	LanguagesTools
IoT		and	Its	Application Smart	GridSmart	House
Related	Works IoT	OntologiesSecurity	Ontologies
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2.2 Semantic Web 
Semantic web refers to an extension of the current web through use of different standards 
supported by the World Wide Web consortium (W3C), which allows exchange of protocols 
and support common data formats [9].  
Major difference that differentiates semantic web technologies from other data technologies 
such as World Wide Web and relational databases is that it deals with the meaning of data 
[10]. The semantic web technologies give us the opportunity to create web data stores, create 
rules for the data handling and build vocabularies. Such technologies include: Resource 
Description Framework (RDF), SPARQL Protocol and RDF Query Language (SPARQL), 
SWRL, and Web Ontology Language (OWL)[11] . 
2.2.1 Ontology	
Ontology refers to the description of concepts and the relationship that exists in the domain of 
interest [12]. The concepts are used for the purpose of representing knowledge and properties. 
Generally, ontology is used to serve various purposes in sharing information since different 
people have different needs to be met. It allows reusability of the already existing knowledge 
thus there is no need to develop new ontology from scratch. It has the concepts to define set 
of entities existing and their relationship in a domain. It allows knowledge sharing between 
semantic independent readers. 
2.2.2 Ontology	languages	
These refer to formal languages that are used in the process of creating ontologies. They allow 
encoding of specific domain knowledge and support reasoning rules for the knowledge 
processing [12]. The use of different languages is defined by the kind of application to be 
developed and any modifications that may be necessary. The ontology languages include: 
2.2.3 Resource	Description	Framework	(RDF)	
This is a data model language used in representing resources in the web and has features that 
support merging of data despite the differences that exist in the underlying schemas. It 
supports schema evolution without the need to change all data consumers. This data model 
language helps in making resource statements in triples form (subject, object and predicate). 
These triples form graph where nodes are subject and object while predicate represents the 
edge of the graph [12].  
The triples are identified through the use of URI (Uniform Resource Identifier). In this case, 
the subject represents the resources to be described and can be a blank node or an IRI. The 
predicate refers to the property of that resource. It describes the binary relationship between 
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subject and object and is always an IRI. The object is the value of the resource which 
corresponds to intersection of columns and rows in traditional relational database table. This 
can be a blank node, literal value or an IRI [13].  
2.2.4 Web	Ontology	Language	(OWL)	
This is a language recommended by W3C designed for semantic web development and is 
based on description logic. It allows the user to create ontologies that behave like other web 
documents and its domain can be described in terms of classes, individuals and properties. 
The OWL class groups individuals of similar characteristics into groups and are identified by 
use of URI through its name. Every class has individuals associated to it and they are called 
member of that class [12]. 
Property defines the binary relationship between individuals of classes or between 
individuals to data value such as integer and string. OWL has three types of properties which 
include, object property, data-type property and annotation property. The object property 
normally denoted as owl: ObjectProperty relates individual from one class to individual 
from another class. For instance, employedAt can be used to relate individual to a company. 
The Data-type property normally denoted as Owl: DatatypeProperty is used to link a class or 
individual to a data value. For example: hasName is used to relate a person to string. The 
annotation property is used to add additional information to classes, individuals and properties 
such as comments and versions. This added information is not interpreted but is there to make 
the ontology easier for human to understand [13]. 
Resource Description Framework Schema (RDFS) 
This is a recommended data modeling language by W3C that defines the semantic 
vocabularies for RDF resources and allows definition of ontologies through the definition of 
classes, taxonomies, properties and relationships existing between classes and properties. 
Elements of RDFS include:  
Rdfs: subClassOf used to indicate that one class is subclass of another class. 
Rdfs: subpropertyOf used to indicate that a property is a sub-property of another. It 
indicates that one property is more specific than another property.  
Rdfs: domain and Rdfs: range - are used to describe the property by defining how the 
property can be used by inferring the number of subject of triples as a member of Class 
domain. 
Rdfs: type - this is used to specify the member of class in a domain. 
2.2.5 Ontology	Development	Tools	
There exist various tools for the development of ontology. The most popular ones are: 
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Protégé: Protégé is an open source ontology editor used in building knowledge based 
solutions in various specialization areas [13]. It is used in creating and editing ontology 
components such as properties, classes and individuals. Classes are sets of Individuals in a 
domain and Domain classes are organized in class hierarchies. Thing is the root class for 
protégé and Subclasses are specialized forms of their super classes. It supports class axioms 
for querying and building the class relations [14] . 
WebProtégé: This is a free, open source collaborative ontology used as an environment for 
development of the web. It has editing interface that provides access to commonly used OWL 
construct. It has revision history and full change tracking. WebProtégé supports editing OWL 
2 and OBO ontologies. It consists of collaborative tools like threaded notes and discussions, 
sharing and permission and watches and email notifications. WebProtégé houses multiple 
formats for both download and upload of ontologies [15]. 
NeOn toolkit [16]: It is a state-of-the-art multi-platform open source ontology engineering 
environment which supports comprehensive ontology life-cycle. The toolkit is based on a 
leading development environment, Eclipse platform and is used to provide extensive set of 
plug-ins that covers various ontology engineering elements. 
Swoop [17]: This is a hypermedia-based featherweight OWL ontology editor. It is an open 
source collaborative ontology that has reasoning capabilities. It does not support tracking and 
versioning. 
OWLGrEd: It is an open source UML style graphical editor used in OWL ontology. 
OWLGrEd has additional elements for graphical ontology development and exploration 
including interoperability with Protégé [18] . 
OntoWiki: This is a front-end application developed for semantic data web to support 
collaborative knowledge engineering scenarios. It serves as a development framework for 
applications which are knowledge intensive. OntoWiki Supports navigation by the use of 
RDF knowledge through SPARQL- generated trees, tables and lists [19]. Resources here are 
represented automatically in form of hyperlinks and therefore, backlinks are generated when 
feasible. 
MoKi [20] This is an open source ontology tool that is partially collaborative and partially 
supports threaded discussions. It has reasoning capabilities but lacks tracking and versioning 
properties. 
Tool Multi 
User 
Distributed/C
ollaborative 
Threaded 
Discussions 
Reasonin
g 
capabiliti
es 
Open 
Source 
Tracking an
d Versioning 
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Protégé 
 
 O O P P O 
WebProtege P P P O P P 
NeOn toolkit  O O P P O 
Swoop P P O P P O 
OWLGrEd  O O O P O 
OntoStudio P P P P O P 
OntoWiki P P P P P P 
MoKi P P P P P O 
Table 1: Comparison between Ontology Development tools 
The beginning for the development of our Ontology has started by comparing various 
ontology development tools based on the parameters shown in table 1. The main aim of the 
comparison is to select a tool that supports collaborative, threaded discussions, 
tracking and versioning, and Open Source. Because IoTSec project is planning to develop the 
full Smart Grid Ontology by its collaborators and all collaborators can add, edit, update, and 
discuss by having the same ontology file. We selected WebProtégé IDE to develop our 
ontology which supports collaborative, threaded discussions, tracking and versioning of the 
ontology.  
2.3 IoT 
In the last two decades, IoT is becoming one of a trending technology.  Even if the number of 
IoT deployments is exponentially increasing, there is no universal definition and standards. 
Different technological organizations and Scholars defined IoT in different terms.  
Gartner define IoT ”The Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of physical objects that 
contain embedded technology to communicate and sense or interact with their internal states 
or the external environment.” 
 IBM also IoT as:” Internet of Things, or IoT, refers to the growing range of Internet-
connected devices that capture or generate an enormous amount of information every day. 
For consumers, these devices include mobile phones, sports wearables, home heating and air 
conditioning systems, and more. In an industrial setting, these devices and sensors can be 
found in manufacturing equipment, the supply chain, and in-vehicle components.”  
According to Ghidini, et al. [20] the application domains of IoT can be classified into four 
broad Personal and home (Smart House), Utilities (Smart Grid, Smart Meter), Enterprise, and 
Transport and Logistics.  This thesis focuses on Smart Grid and Smart House application 
domains.  
 
 
  8 
2.3.1 Smart	Grid	
According to the U.S Government's International Energy Outlook 2016, world energy 
consumption is projected to increase by 48 percent from 2012 to 20401. U.S Department of 
Energy's Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) define Smart grid as “the 
digital technology that allows for two-way communication between the utility and its 
customers, and the sensing along the transmission lines.”2 
The way that transforms the traditional power grid system to Smart Grid is the ability of the 
grid to give responses to events and conditions at instant time. The events may occur at the 
power generation, transmission, distribution, or consumption. But the Smart Grid should give 
responses within instant period of time. Figure 2-2 depicts the traditional power grid 
architecture. 
 
Figure	2-2:	Traditional	Power	Grid	architecture	[21]	
 Fang, et al. [21] presented the difference between the traditional (current power grid) and 
Smart grid as shown in table 2 below. 
                                                
1 https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/world.cfm  
2 https://www.smartgrid.gov/the_smart_grid/smart_grid.html  
Traditional Power Grid Smart Grid 
Electromechanical Digital 
One-Way Communication Two-Way Communication 
Centralized Generation Distributed Generation 
Hierarchical Network 
Few Sensors Sensors Throughout 
Blind Self-monitoring 
Manual Restoration Self-Healing 
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	 Table	2:	Comparison	between	Traditional	Power	Grid	and	Smart	Grid	
Smart Grid Components 
Smart Grid consists of all components from power generation till small home appliances that 
use electric power for different purposes. Hoang [22]identified five main Smart Grid 
components, which include: 
i. Intelligent appliances: - Smart Appliances (Smart home appliances and other 
appliances) are becoming common in our daily life. Most of the industries which 
produce appliances are shifting their focus from traditional products to smart products. 
The benefits of these appliances are two folds. For example, you can save up to 25% 
energy consumptions by programming your appliances to reduce energy usage at peak 
load time [23].  
ii. Smart power meters (Smart Meter) [22]: -  is one of the components of Smart Grid 
which records automatically the energy consumption of the end users with in an 
interval of an hour or less to provide billing and other information to the power 
providers and for the end users. The Smart meter can read electric data such as 
Voltage and Frequency then up-to-date energy consumption details can  be generated 
for the appropriate users. The generated data includes unique Id of the smart meter, 
timestamp of the data, electric consumption value and so on.  As shown from figure 2-
3 below Smart meter provides a two-way information flow between the meter and the 
central systems.  
  
Failures and Blackouts Remote Check/Test 
Limited Control Pervasive Control 
Few Customer Choices Many Customer Choices 
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Figure	2-3:Metering	architectures	of	conventional	energy	meter	and	smart	meter	[24]	
 
iii. Smart distribution [25]: - Power provides need to build several Distribution stations 
and transmission lines to transfer power from generator to consumers. The main aim 
of making distribution stations smart is to use the power efficiently and effectively by 
minimizing losses and adapting the capacity based on the consumption of power. 
iv. Smart Generation [24]: - Generation is the various power generators used in the 
power generation system. This includes hydro-power, coal, nuclear, wind, and solar 
power generation system. The Smart Generation handles all these heterogeneous 
sources of power to cooperatively work the generation strategy without the 
interference of human being. 
v. Smart substations: - “Smart substations monitor and control of critical and non-
critical operational data such as power factor performance, breaker, transformer and 
battery status, security, etc.” [26] 
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Figure 2-4:Smart Grid Infrastructure3 
Smart grid Technologies: - Smart Grid is a collection of various technologies such as 
communication devices (wireless and wired), sensors, actuators, and software. According to 
[26] Smart Grid technologies can be grouped into five categories:  
a. Integrated Communications [22]: -  Smart grid uses almost use all wireless and 
wired communication technologies. The wireless communication technologies include 
wireless mesh network such as IEEE 802.11, 802.16, WiMax; cellular  
communication system such as 3G, 4G, and GSM; satellite communication, 
MicroWave and wired communication technologies such as PLC, and fiber optics.  
b. Sensing and Measurement: - As you can see from the above figure 2-4, Smart Grid 
is mainly made up of Sensing and measurements. Sensors are the main components of 
every components in Smart Grid to give automatic response for checking well-being 
and integrity of the grid [22].  
c. Advanced Control Methods: - The advanced control methods are the devices, 
sensors and the algorithms used to control the power grid systems [26]. 
                                                
3 http://iotap.mah.se/post-doc-radu-casian-mihailescu/  
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d. Improved Interfaces and Decision Support: - includes mobile applications, 
computer software, voice commands and simple user interfaces which is easy to 
understand and use for the power grid operators. 
e. Advanced Components: - “are used to determine the electrical behaviour of the grid 
and can be applied in either standalone applications or connected together to create 
complex systems such as microgrids.” [22] 
2.3.2 Smart	House	
Smart house is one of the hot research area since the beginning of the new millennium. Smart 
home research survey which was conducted by Jiang, et al. [27]  shows that numerous smart 
house research and projects were conducted in Europe, Asia, and USA. The projects were run 
by companies like CISCO, Microsoft, and Philip; and Universities and other research 
institutions. Since then many projects and researches that improve the energy efficiency, 
health care services, making smart appliances, improving security and surveillances, and 
improving the comfort of the life of the human being have been conducted.  
Smart Home Energy4  defined Smart home as 
 “smart home, or smart house, is a home that incorporates advanced automation systems to 
provide the inhabitants with sophisticated monitoring and control over the building's 
functions. For example, a smart home may control lighting, temperature, multi-media, 
security, window and door operations, as well as many other functions.”  
Smart home is the interconnection of different devices and these devices have the capacity to 
share data between them. It also contains several sensors such as  Gas leak sensor, Smoke 
Sensor, Wind and Rain Sensor, Door magnet sensor, Lighting switch, Body Sensor, and Air 
conditioner sensor. 
Hoang [22] and Jiang, et al. [27] classified Smart homes into four application areas. These are: 
Energy management and Efficiency, Entertainment, Health care, and Security and Surveillance.   
a) Energy management and Efficiency: - According to Norwegian Statistics Bureau 
energy consumption report of 2015 and 20145, the energy consumption of household 
was increased by 2% while the total energy consumption was increased only by 1.2%. 
Household shares the largest part of the world’s energy consumption. The number of 
population growth and energy consumption have a direct relationship if we are using 
                                                
4 http://smarthomeenergy.co.uk/what-smart-home 
 
5 http://www.ssb.no/en/energibalanse  
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the tradition energy management system (hierarchical, and centrally controlled), i.e., 
as the number of population increases, the consumption of power also increases. In 
recent years, the use of smart appliances and connecting devices at home are 
increasing from time to  time due to the emergence of IoT technologies. To ensure a 
sustainable and efficient use of energy system in homes, Information and 
communication technologies are playing a significant role. Reducing the cost of 
energy, and minimizing energy wastage of the homes by increasing the user’s comfort 
are the main objective of energy management. Shifting from hierarchical and centrally 
controlled Grid system to Smart Grid and Smart meter technologies are helping to 
achieve these objectives. 
b) Entertainment: - The invention of Internet and IoT enabled smart home 
revolutionized entertainment industry in fast-paced manner. It is possible to access any 
sound, image, or videos at any place. Smart home can be changed to home theatre, 
multimedia room, and distributed audio/video systems with a simple smart remote like 
smart watch by advanced user interface such as voice command, gestures, face 
recognition, scheduling task, etc6.  
c) Health care: - Smart home has improved and changed the traditional health care 
systems. Health care is one of the most sensitive services which needs accurate 
information. Smart home components such Appliances, sensors and Body area 
network devices support the health care system. For example, De Silva, et al. [28] 
designed a fridge that supports the health care system. One of the challenging things in 
this application area is that all devices and information are not available only in the 
smart house.  
Even if so many promising results have been achieved in this application domain, there are 
still challenges that should be dealt with. The challenges are “usability, data privacy and 
security, integration and processing of diverse data streams, validation of clinical grade 
sensors, and the need for high quality evidence showing improved efficiency and cost-
effectiveness.” [29]. 
d) Security and Surveillance:- Smart houses have equipped and installed different 
devices and applications to control and follow the safety and security of its residents. 
Few of the systems and devices which are used for safety and security are: 
• Movement sensors,  
                                                
6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mEzSF29EBgI  
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• Video surveillance,  
• Remote monitoring 
• Alarming, etc 
From these four smart home application areas, our focus is energy management and 
efficiency, and Security of Smart Home. The next section review Smart Home Energy 
Management Vulnerabilities, Attacks and Counter Measures. 
2.3.3 Smart	Home	Energy	Management	Vulnerabilities,	and	Attacks		
Beckers, et al. [30] proposed threat analysis of Smart Home Energy Management by 
following Microsoft Security Development Life Cycle. The threat analysis identifies 
vulnerabilities and possible attacks on Smart Home main components such as Smart Meter, 
Home Gateway, and SHEMS. They also proposed possible reasoning at each component. But 
the proposal didn’t include possible countermeasures and  also, they didn’t implement their 
threat model. 
Aloul, et al. [31] identified Smart Grid Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Solutions. They identified 
the infrastructure, attackers, attack types and possible solutions by reviewing different 
literatures. Both Beckers, et al. [30] and Aloul, et al. [31] didn’t implemented their models. 
2.4 IoT and Security Ontologies 
As we have described in the above section, the infrastructure of Smart Grids and Smart 
houses consist of a bunch of Sensors, Communication technologies, heterogeneous 
environments, and heterogeneous devices.  
In this section, we review Ontologies that are developed to handle different functions of IoT 
objects. After reviewing the ontologies, we compare them based on selected parameters to 
reuse some parts of the ontology in our work. 
2.4.1 IoT	Ontologies	
2.4.1.1 Semantic Sensor Network (SSN) Ontology [32]  
SSN is one of the widely used and customizable sensor ontology. SSN Ontology was 
designed and developed by W3C Semantic Sensor Network Incubator Group which consists 
of 39 members from 20 organizations. The members were from universities, small companies, 
multinational companies, and research institutions from USA, Germany, Australia, Germany, 
Ireland, Finland, Spain, China, and Korea. It was a one year project.  
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The focus of the project was designing and developing an ontology that describes sensors and 
observations. The description of the sensors includes measuring capabilities, operating 
conditions, survival conditions, sensor deployment, ways of sensing, and the output of the 
sensing. The final ontology consists of 41 classes (concepts) and 39 object properties 
organized in to modules as shown in the figure below. Some of the Concepts and Object 
properties are reused from DOLCE ultralite ontology (DUL)7.  A single module of the 
ontology consists of one or more concepts. 
 
Figure 2-5:SSN Ontology 8 
This ontology didn’t define data properties and didn’t instantiate individuals. It shows only 
concepts and Object properties. Data Properties and individuals can be defined by the people 
who customize this ontology based on their needs.  
W3C started an effort to standardize this ontology by publishing W3C First Public Working 
Draft on 31 May 20169. The recent working draft is also launched on 04 May 201710. They 
are a group of four people trying to solve the challenges of the previous version of SSN 
released on 2011. The group has identified different challenges and proposed the ideal 
solutions for standardizing the ontology. For example, one of the main challenges of SSN is 
its complexity; because one third of concepts and Object properties are inherited from DUL 
ontology. The group separated the SSN part that use DUL terms into the SSN alignment with 
DUL ontology. 
                                                
7 https://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/ssn/wiki/DUL_ssn  
8 https://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/ssn/XGR-ssn-20110628/  
9 https://www.w3.org/TR/2016/WD-vocab-ssn-20160531/ 
10 https://www.w3.org/TR/vocab-ssn/  
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2.4.1.2 IoT-Lite 
 It is the instantiation of SSN Ontology [33]. The developers of this ontology believed that 
IoT ontologies should not be complex and should not increase possessing capacity. This 
ontology has Object, System and Services as the main classes as shown in figure 2-6 below.  
System has one sub class called Device. Device has SensingDevice, TagDevice and Actuating 
Device as its sub classes. In SSN Ontology Actuator, Location, and timing are not explicitly 
defined. But IoT- Lite Ontology defined these three concepts. In total the ontology consists of 
18 classes and 13 object Properties. The group also proposed 10 rules for good and scalable 
semantic model design.  
 
Figure 2-6: IoT-Lite Ontology [32] 
2.4.1.3 SAREF [34] 
SAREF ontology provides semantic interoperability between house appliances to save and 
use energy consumption efficiently. It is a standard reference ontology prepared by ETSI 
(European Telecommunications Standards Institute). It has more than 125 classes, 45 object 
properties, 12 data properties and instantiated few individuals11. At the beginning of 2017, 
SAREF ontology has been extended to SAREF4EE, Weather, and M2M(Industrial) domains 
by ETSI task force. The Energy domain ontology consists of 253 classes, 87 data properties, 
97 object properties, and 173 individuals. 
                                                
11 http://ontology.tno.nl/saref/  
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2.4.1.4 Ontology-Based Smart Home Solution and Service Composition 
 Xu, et al. [35] proposed an ontology-based smart home architecture which contains four 
domain ontology system: Device Ontology, Environment Ontology, Function Ontology and 
Policy Ontology. Device Ontology defines the available device, properties and categorizes 
based on parameters such as processing capacity and energy capacity.  Environment Ontology 
defines based on the season and temperature, and house owner’s health condition. They stated 
that health and age of a person plays a significant role in arranging the energy of the home. 
Function ontology defines and labels devices according to the services they provide. For 
example, Devices that are using temperature control can be named as Temperature control 
devices. Policy ontology is a set of rules prepared to control the smart house. For example, 
“When the temperature is above 5 Celsius, Turnoff the heater.”   
2.4.1.5 Semantic information modelling for emerging applications in smart grid. 
Zhou, et al. [36] model a Smart Grid knowledge base based on real-time consumption, 
infrastructure information, consumer behaviour, schedule information and natural condition. 
They represented their models by using one of the most widely used ontology language called 
OWL. Their ontology is categorized into six component ontologies. These are Electrical 
Equipment, Organization, Infrastructure, Weather, Spatial and Temporal Ontologies. While 
developing this Ontology, they reused standard and well developed ontologies from different 
sources to improve the interoperability of IoT in Smart Grid. 
Ontologies Open Access 
Recommended Scenario Security and Privacy 
SSN P W3C O O 
IoT-Lite P W3C O O 
SAREF P ETSI P O 
Xu, et al. 
[35] 
O - P O 
Zhou, et al. 
[36] 
O - P O 
Table	3:	Comparison	of	IoT	Ontologies 
We compared the ontologies based on four parameters. The parameters are: 
Open Access: whether the ontology is availably freely or not. 
Recommend by: There are thousands of ontologies available on the web; but the difficulty is 
finding the standard ontology. It is better to use Ontologies recommended by and 
Standardized by W3C and ESTI.   
Scenario:  The focus of the Ontology domain.  
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Security and Privacy: Does the Ontology supports security and privacy?  
Our scenario is on Home Energy management system. As we can see from table 3 the best 
candidate Ontology that we can reuse to extend our work is SAREF ontology [34]. SAREF 
focuses on energy management, M2M communication, and Environment. We extend the 
energy management domain ontology.  
2.4.2 Security	Ontology	
SANS institute defined Information Security as: “Information Security refers to the processes 
and methodologies which are designed and implemented to protect print, electronic, or any 
other form of confidential, private and sensitive information or data from unauthorized 
access, use, misuse, disclosure, destruction, modification, or disruption.” 12 
Information security products can be categorized into two: Traditional Information Security 
and Adaptive Information Security. Tradition Information Security have constant ways of 
handling threats; whereas Adaptive Information Security can monitor, learn, and adapt to 
vulnerabilities and threats of the environment and act based on the context[7, 37, 38]. As the 
context and threats changes, the security mechanism also changes. For example, changing the 
authentication mechanism according to the risk context, high risk or low risk. 
The following sections review Security Ontologies. Some of the ontologies we reviewed are 
designed based on the adaptive concepts; whereas the rest are designed for traditional 
Security concepts. 
2.4.2.1 An Ontology of Information Security 
The aim of this ontology is to create common vocabulary related to general information 
security concepts [39]. “The ontology consists of 88 threat classes, 79 asset classes, 133 
countermeasure classes and 34 relations between those classes.”  
Threat in information technology is an event that may expose your system at risk.  There 
should be a way to handle these threats. This ontology has defined counter measure classes to 
mitigate risks. Asset is all resources such as data and all communication devices. 
2.4.2.2 Ontology Based Approach for Network Security 
This ontology has three top classes namely Network, Attack and Vulnerability.  Based on 
parameter such as Time, Source port, Destination port, Source IP Address, Destination IP 
Address, Server, Attribute Source, and Name, Actor location, Scope of the network, 
                                                
12 https://www.sans.org/information-security/  
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Automation level, Goal of the network, and type of service  predicts the chance of the attack 
to the system is either high or Low.  
2.4.2.3 Ontology for attack detection [40] 
This work mainly focuses on three areas. The first focus is ontological model of 
communication protocol. This component of the ontology describes HTTP Protocol attack, 
Request and response of HTTP protocol during malicious attacks. Second, Ontological Model 
of Attack, “This model captures the context of important web application attacks, various 
technologies used by the hackers, source and target of an attack, impact on the system 
components affected by the attack, vulnerabilities exploited by the attack and control in terms 
of policies for mitigating these attacks.” 
The other effort of this work is the proposal of best metrics for evaluating Security 
Ontologies. The identified  metrics are Formal correctness/Accuracy/Validity of the model,  
Consistency and Soundness, Task orientation, Completeness and Conciseness (domain 
coverage),  Expandability and Reusability, Clarity, Computational complexity, Integrity and 
Efficiency,  System performance by using throughput and response time, Preciseness and 
Quality measure by using precision, recall and F-measure, Model expressiveness,  Ontology 
expressiveness, Attack modeling formalism, Inference support, and Protocol layer for attack 
detection. 
2.4.2.4 SecurOntology [41] 
This ontology is defined to handle resources according to the organization hierarchy roles and 
permissions by using Access Control List method. To achieve this objective the developers 
defined 6 main classes and 8 main object Properties. The classes include:  Resources, Owner, 
Roles, Permission, ResourceAndPermission, and ConsultInstance. The main power of this 
ontology is the rules defined by using the SWARL13 for inferring and reasoning new 
knowledge. 
2.4.2.5 Interoperability of Security-Enabled Internet of Things 
  Alam, et al. [42] developed an OWL-Ontology which consists of three domain ontologies: 
Sensor Ontology, Event Ontology and Access Control Ontology. The sensor Ontology 
describe not only the Sensors (devices), but also the data collected from the Sensors. The 
Event ontology describes faults occurred by the sensors and recommended actions to manage 
these faults.  Access Control Ontology defines restriction for the resources. In this case, the 
resources are Sensors and Sensor data. By using Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) and 
                                                
13 https://www.w3.org/Submission/SWRL/  
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the Semantic Web Query–Enhanced Web Rule Language (SQWRL) rules, they managed to 
implement different access control policies for their scenarios.  
2.4.2.6 Towards a Reference Ontology for Security in the Internet of Things 
Mozzaquatro, et al. [43] reviewed a number of Generic Security Ontologies and proposed a 
reference ontology for IoT Security. They also tried to implement Adaptive Security concepts. 
Adaptive Security adjusts automatically the security parameters and constraints to mitigate 
security vulnerabilities and attacks.  Adaptive security follows the control theory rule which is 
Monitor, Analyse, and Adapt based on the security model [37]. The ontology defines Assets, 
Vulnerabilities, Threats, Security Mechanism and Security Property. The main drawback of 
this ontology is that its security framework Assets, Vulnerabilities, Threats, Security 
Mechanism and Security Property is designed from the perspective of communication 
technologies and the architecture of the communication system. 
2.4.2.7 Ontology-based Security Adaptation at Run-Time 
This ontology fully defined the concept of Adaptive Security [44]. The ontology has Monitor, 
Analyser, Measure and Adapter based on the Context. The Context has desired and achieved 
security threshold. The adaptation happens either at run-time or start-up phase.  
Table 4 below shows comparison of different IoT Security Ontologies: 
Comparis
on 
Generi
c 
Adaptiv
e 
Open 
Access 
Scenario IoT 
[42] P O O - O 
[43] P O O - O 
[37] P O O - O 
[44] O O O -  
[45] O O O Railway P 
[46] P P P C2Net P 
[40] P P O Smart 
space 
O 
Table	4:comparison	of	IoT	Security	Ontologies 
The parameters used to compare the ontologies are: 
Generic: Describe whether the ontology is general or not. 
Adaptive Security:  whether the ontology supports adaptive security concepts. 
Open Access: The ontology is freely available on the web. 
and supporting IoT concepts. 
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Chapter	3	
3 Design and Scenario Description 
3.1 Introduction  
From the perspective of IoT Security and Privacy, we categorized Smart Grid in to six broad 
domains. As shown in the figure 3-1, the domains are Aggregators, Smart House, Critical 
Infrastructure, Distributed System Objects (DSO), Security and Privacy.  
 
	
Figure	3-1:	Smart	Grid	Architecture 
From the above six domains of the Ontology, our focus is Smart House Energy Management 
System, and Security domains. Based on these two domains our scenario is described in the 
following section.  
3.2 Scenario Description 
This scenario description identified main components, threats, vulnerabilities, 
countermeasures and stakeholders of Smart Home Energy Management. The source of the 
information is Literature review. 
Scenario name: Smart Home Energy Management Security (SHEMSec) 
HEMS mainly consists the following Components [30]: 
a) Application (SHEM) 
b) Smart Meter 
c) Smart Appliance 
d) Home Gateway 
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e) Cryptographic Keystore 
f) Personal Identifiable Information (PII) 
g) Billing Data 
3.2.1 Infrastructure and Service of SHEM [30] 
a) The Home Energy Management System (HEMS)  
HEMS is an application that is used to manage Smart Appliances, access billing data, and 
responds to Demand Side Management events. Energy Suppliers and other third parties 
communicate through HEMS.   
External Dependency: Home Gateway or router provides the security and privacy of the 
communication infrastructure. Sometimes, Smart Meter is also used as a router.  
Security Assumption: The Energy producers and consumers have access only to the user 
interface of energy management. They don’t have permission for accessing or altering other 
functionalities.  
Security Note: Consumers can access the interface of EMS by using mobile or other devices. 
They do not have the physical access of EMS. 
Contains Assets: Cryptographic keys and Billing Data in real-time frequency. 
b) Smart Meter  
Smart is one of the components of Smart Grid which records automatically the energy 
consumption of the end users with in an interval of an hour or less to provide billing and other 
information to the power providers and for the end users. The Smart meter can read electric 
data such as Voltage and Frequency then up-to-date energy consumption details can  be 
generated for the appropriate users. The generated data includes unique Id of the smart meter, 
timestamp of the data, electric consumption value and so on. If the measuremnet of Smart 
Meter is not accurate, it affects the billing, the energy forecast, demand side response, and all 
stake holders. Some Smart Meter is also used as a Gateway for Smart Home. 
External dependency: If the Smart Meter is not a hybrid (functions as both Smart Meter and 
Home Gateway), it partially depends on Home Gateway to access EMS. 
Security Assumption: The connection is stable and trustable through Home Gateway. 
Security Notes: Technicians like Meter Point Operator (MPO) who install and configure 
devices like Smart Meter does not obtain any energy consumption data of the producers and 
consumers. Smart meter does not have permission to remotely shutdown energy. 
Contains Assets: Billing Data, and Cryptographic keys  
c) Home Gateway (HG)  
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Home Gateway is used as a communication channel for all devices and services of the 
internal Smart Home as well as external to the Smart Grid.  For example, when SHEM  wants 
to control Smart appliances, the request directly goes to Home Gateway. Then, HG 
authenticate the request, and gives permission for it. 
External Dependency: The configuration of HG is done by the suppliers. They should ensure 
the availability and proper configuration of HG. 
Security Assumptions: HG should support apply Authentication  and Confidentiality. 
Configuration of addresses such as IP address and domain name should be configured 
properly. 
Security Notes: producers and consumers should check the correctness of the receiving data. 
If there is any error, they should report to to MPO. 
Contains Assets: Communication Keys for the Home Area Network. 
d) Cryptographic keystores [30] 
Every assets (HEMS, Smart Meter, Smart Appliances, and Home Gateway) has 
Cryptographic keystores.  
External dependency: There are different protocols used for secret generation, key exchange 
and management. Each protocol has different level in securing the messages integrity and 
authenticity.  
Security Assumptions: Key storage is only accessible internally by the device or the system. 
e) Personal identifiable information: customer profile data, billing data  
 Personal Identifiable Information (PII) includes details of the consumer such as his name, 
address, personal number, Bank Account number, billing data, and Credentials. 
External Dependency: Consumer billing data is the readings of Smart meter. 
Security Assumptions: The reading of Smart Meter should be accurate.  
Security notes: The cryptographic keystore should be protected from physically damage. 
f) Define stakeholders [30] 
The Home Energy Management stake holders include Domain Regulators, Legislators, 
Prosumer/consumer, Energy Supplier, 3rd Party Energy Supplier, Meter Point Operator, 3rd 
Party Service Supplier, etc. 
 
3.2.2 Determine vulnerabilities [30] 
1. HG vulnerabilities 
 The most common attack of HG is network attack. Since all devices and systems are 
connected to HG, it is vulnerable to attacks against these networks.  
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2. Smart Energy Meter vulnerabilities 
As of HG, Smart Energy Meter is vulnerable to network attack. It is connected to the smart 
home using WLAN or other communication technologies. Smart Meter´s should be tamper 
proof. 
3. Home Energy management system vulnerabilities 
HEMS is an application accessible by a device like mobile and computer. It can be attacked 
by both Network and Software attacks. 
3.2.3 Determine Threats to Home Energy Management System [30] 
Spoofing: - is a Software attacker. It is a type of attack where unauthorized user access to a 
user's information which leads to information disclosure and denial of service. In this case, 
the attacker will alter, delete and controls the data and devices of the Smart home as his will. 
Tampering: - is a Software attacker. In this scenario, the attacker can modify user policies,  
changing device parameters that might lead to burning and physically harming people around 
that area.  
Repudiation: This attack type is Software attacker. An attacker can override non-repudiation 
mechanisms. 
Information disclosure: - This attack type is Software attacker. The privacy of the user will 
be manipulated. Billing and other sensitive personal information might be exploited. All 
communication in Home Area Network will be publicised. 
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Figure	3-2:	Threat	from	outside	SH	(Threat	Model)	[30] 
Denial of service: This attack type is Software attacker. DoS lead to stopping all 
communication between Stake holders, denying access to EMS, and denying appliances and 
sensors control. 
Elevation of privileges:  This attack type is Software attacker. This attack type gives 
additional privilege for the user of the system. “The EMS supports third party plugins, which 
are allowed a sandboxed space in the EMS’ functionality. If a malicious plugin is able to find 
a backdoor to the full EMS functionality, several assets could be compromised: Billing Data 
and customer profile data that identify the customer, cryptographic keys which allow proper 
authentication against the Energy Supplier, other third parties and the Smart Meter. The EMS 
controls the physical behaviour of Smart Appliances which might endanger the appliance 
itself or the well-being of persons inside the house.” [30] 
 
 
 
Figure	3-3:	Threat	from	Inside	(Threat	Model	2)	[30]	
As we can see from figure 3-2 and 3-3, threats can be classified in to two: Inside Attacker and 
Outside Attacker. Inside attackers is a real user of a system. But he/she misuses his/her 
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authorization to perform an attack on resources. Outside attackers do not have credential to 
use the system. They hack remotely the smart home energy resources such as billing data, 
smart appliance and sensors.  
3.2.4 Counter Measures (Possible Solutions) 
Security Mechanism or Counter Measures might be different for different types of security 
threats or attacks. Based on Literatures  [30, 31, 38, 47-51], Microsoft14, Cisco15 and 
OWASP16 security guide lines, the counter measures for the attacks described in 3.2.3 are: 
Counter Measure for Spoofing:   Spoofing mitigation mechanisms includes: 
• Use Strong Authentication Mechanisms at the device, sensor, and application level.  
• Encrypt passwords 
• Use Secure communication protocols such as SSL, and HTTPs. 
Counter Measure for Tampering:    Tampering Can be mitigated by strong authorization, 
digital signature, hashing, secure communication links such as SSL and HTTPs, and use 
specific protocols designed for Tampering.  
Counter measure for Information Disclosure: Information discloser can be mitigated by 
using strong authorization protocols, strong encryption protocols, encrypt passwords and 
other secrets, and using private-enhanced protocols. 
Counter measure for Denial of service: The solution includes: 
• Home gateway can filter address that can enter to the HAN by using Firewall and 
Access control mechanisms. 
• Using trolling technique by controlling the data rate in to the HAN and out of the 
network. 
• Using appropriate authorization for device, sensors and applications 
• Using appropriate authorization for device, sensors and applications 
Counter Measure for Elevation of privileges:  Assigning the minimum role for the user.  
In addition to mitigating attacks at specific nodes, devices and systems, it is important to 
ensure the entire system is working correctly. The solutions that we have discussed above are 
not the only solution for these attacks. The attacks that might happen in SHEM can be 
mitigated by considering different parameter such as the environment, communication 
technologies, Software’s used, etc. Each parameter might have specific security metrics to 
follow to mitigate the vulnerabilities of a System. The most common Security Mechanisms 
                                                
14 https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff648641.aspx 
15 http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/secure-iot-proposed-framework.html  
16 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Application_Threat_Modeling  
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are Access Control, Authorization, Authentication, Firewall, Encryptions, and mechanisms 
developed for specific technologies such as WiFi Security Mechanisms, Sensor Security 
Mechanisms, Firewall, antivirus, etc.  
3.3 Ontology Design 
 The design of the ontology represents the relationship between basic components of the 
Smart Home Energy Managent components and Security components. The design follows 
risk analysis model which is recommended by ISO/IEC and National Institute of Standards 
and Technology(NIST). The top level classes include: Assets, Vulnerability, Threat, Security 
Property, Risk and Security Mechanisms. Figure 3-4 presents top-level classes of our 
security ontolog based on literatures [43, 45]. 
 
	
Figure	3-4:	Security	ontology	top-level	classes	
 
Our Asset class is imported from SAREF Ontology extended for Home Energy Management. 
In this work Assets referes to all devices, sensors, communication technologies, and services 
of the Home Energy Management.  The developers of SAREF ontology imported Geo and 
Time Ontology17. Geo and Time ontology describe location and temporal entity. SAREF 
ontology describes the energy management of Appliances. SAREF4EE is SAREF ontology 
extended for home energy management.  
We extended SAREF4EE to develop Security ontology for Smart Home Energy Management. 
                                                
17 ttps://www.w3.org/TR/owl-time/  
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Figure	3-5:	Structure	of	Imported	ontologies 
Assets have vulnerabilities.  Vulnerability class describes potential flaws in the Smart Home 
Energy Environment.  
 
	
Figure	3-6:	Asset(SAREF)	Home	Energy	Management	and	Vulnerability	(hasVulnerability)	
relationship 
The flaws can occur either in software or hardware platforms. All devices, Sensors and 
Software’s might have vulnerabilities. 
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Threat class consists of possible threats (attacks) that might happen in Smart Home Energy 
management. The threat identified in section 3.2.3 are: Tampering, Denial of Service, 
Spoofing, Repudiation, Disclosure of Information, and Elevation of Privilege.  These 
threats affect security properties of Smart Home Energy Management System.  
CounterMeasure class consists of algorithms, protocols or tools used for mitigating 
threats(attacks). This class has subclasses like Encryption, Firewall, Checksum, Hash, 
KeyManagement, Credentials, and TrustManagement.  
These protocols, tools, and algorithms are used by devices and applications. Some devices 
might not support the usual protocols and algorithms used by computer due to their 
processing capacity, memory and other factors. For example, Sensors nodes with limited 
processing capacities can use constrained device protocols instead of the usual protocols and 
algorithms. We also described protocols related to constrained devices.  
Security Mechanism protocols, algorithms and tools ensure the security attributes of the smart 
home Energy management devices, sensors, and applications.   
SecurityProperty class includes Availability, Integrity, confidentiality, Trust, and Non-
Repudiation.  
Risk level  can be High, Low or Medium by multiplying likelihood and impact18 
(Vulnerability and Threa 
Smart home Energy Management has different users such as consumers, producers, 
technicians, 3rd party service provides, etc. By using Role-Base Access Control and 
Credential, we can ensure Confidentiality and Integrity. 
Figure 3-8 Presents Role-Base Access Control Architecture for Smart Home Energy 
Management Application. The figure categorized the components in to User, Role, 
Credential, Command, Data Source.  
Users: are any person/Device who uses the system.  
Role: We categorized the role into Home Owner, AMI Operator, Producer, Service provider, 
etc. The Role gives permissions for specific group of users to access smart home data or 
devices. For example, Home owner can access billing data, turn on/off Appliances, and read 
sensor data. But AMI operator cannot access billing data. 
 
                                                
18 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology 
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Figure 3-7: Smart Home Energy Management Access Control Architecture 
Credentials:  is a security mechanism that ensure confidentiality, and authenticity.  
Measurement and Command: After the user is authenticated and based on role permission, 
she/she can access interface of the SHEMS (Command). The command includes reading 
billing data, turning off/On appliances and lights, pausing tasks and others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  31 
Chapter	Four	
4 Implementation	and	Results	
4.1 Introduction  
For Developing our ontology we followed the guide proposed by Noy and McGuinness called 
Ontology Development 101 [52]. The guide illustrates seven steps that can be applied during 
ontology development process. It also describes a mechanism that can guide the developed to 
evaluate the ontology. The development process may need several iterations before producing 
the final ontology. 
• Step 1: Determine the domain and scope of the ontology: The ontology should 
have precise domain and scope. For our work, the scope and the domain were fixed 
from the beginning. i.e., we focused on the smart House Energy Management Security 
domain.  
• Step 2: Consider reusing existing ontologies: From the beginning reviewing 
available ontologies is beneficial. As we described in the previous chapter we have 
compared various ontologies and we have chosen to use SAREF ontology which is a 
reference Ontology for Smart Energy Management. 
• Step 3: Enumerate important terms in the ontology: Before starting the ontology 
development, it is good to identify and write down all terminologies that is useful in 
the ontology. SAREF ontology which is extended for Home Energy Management 
consists of 253 classes, 87 data properties, 97 object properties, and 173 individuals. It 
has key terms such as  Device, Command, Function, Property, State and Task. We 
also added Security Keywords such as Threat, CounterMeasures, SecurityAttributes, 
Spoofing, DenialOfService, InformationDisclosure, Encryption, SecureProtocol, 
Firewall, Integrity, Availability, Confidentiality, and much more.    
• Step 4: Define the classes and the class hierarchy: As we have described in section 
3.3, our ontology defined Infrastructure, Service, Attacks, Vulnerabilities, Threats, 
Counter Measures concepts and properties. The Infrastructure and Service of Home 
Energy Management concepts are imported from SAREF ontology. We can take these 
classes as an Assets of our system. Figure 4-1 shows the main classes of Assets or 
Systems of Home Energy Management imported from SAREF ontology. 
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Figure 4-1: SAREF Ontology Main Classes 
	
 
Figure 4-2: Command Class Hierarchy 
One of the Infrastructure and Service class is Command class which is imported from 
SAREF ontology. It is used as an application interface(HEMS) to access the Smart meter 
readings, to Put On, Off Light and other Switch and Appliances, to close and open other 
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devices. To access these commands, the user should be authenticated by using one of the 
Access control credentials. 
 
Figure	4-3:		Threat	class	Hierarchy	
 
Threat classes include all possible attacks that might happen in Home Energy Management 
Infrastructure and services. For example, Smart Meter might be attacked by Inside or outside 
attackers. The attack types include DoS, Spoofing, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, and 
other specific attacks related to infrastructure such as Sensor flooding and WiFi Attacks. 
	
	
	
Figure	4-4:	Security	Mechanisms	Class	Hierarchy	
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SecurityMechanism class contains some of the Mechanisms used for mitigating attacks and 
vulnerabilities. Encryption, Firewall, Key Management, Secure Protocol, and others are used 
for ensuring availability, confidentiality, integrity, and accountability. 
 
 
	
Figure	4-5:	Security	Attributes	
 
SecurityMechanism class supports one or more Security attributes. 
• Step 5: Define the properties of classes and individuals: Defining object and data 
properties is one of the most important parts of ontology development. While defining 
object and data properties, we can specify the domain and range of them.  
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Figure	4-6:	Object	property 
 
• Step 6: Define the facets of the properties: Inverse property, cardinality (number of 
values), and supported values are some of the facets of properties. Figure 4-6 presents 
the number of values(cardinality) of object and Data properties of Energy Meter. 
 
Figure	4-7:	Properties	of	Energy	Meter	
• Step 7: Create instances (individuals) individuals are the lowest granularities of 
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the ontology. Individuals have inherited properties from classes that they belong to.  
Figure	4-8:	Sample	Individual	
As we can see from figure 4-7, Individual named Meter_Reading has an instance value meter 
reading type EnergyMet(energy meter) which is measured by kilowatt per hour and has 
measurement value of 35.5. 
4.2  Evaluation of the Ontology 
The ontology can be evaluated by creating rules, inferring the knowledge and running 
Queries. OWL uses SWRL rule and SPARQL query to execute inference results from the 
developed ontologies. We create rules and run queries based on our Scenario.  
Query 1: Does the Smart Meter has Mitigation technique for Spoofing?  
Spoofing can be mitigated by strong authentication, using Hash Function for storing keystore, 
password, other data and using protected Protocols such as SSL. 
Query	1:	
SELECT	?Encription	?Hash	?Secure_Protocol	
	 WHERE	{	:Smart_Electric_Meter	:hasEncryption	?En.	
	 													?En	:hasValue	?Encription.	
																							:Smart_Electric_Meter	:hasHash	?Hash.	
									 				:Smart_Electric_Meter	:hasSecureProtocol	?Secure_Protocol.}	
Result 1: 
 
While we execute the above query, as shown from the result, the device has a capacity of 
using AES Encryption algorithm, supports SHA-1 hash function and use SSL protocol. The 
probability of spoofing attack is low. 
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Rule 1: Categorize devices in the SHEMS as High, Medium, or Low Spoofing attack 
probabilities. 
Let d be Device, e be Encryption, h be Hash Function, s be Secure protocol 
If a device supports encryption algorithm or protocol, Hash Function and Secure protocol the 
chance of spoofing attack is very low. Rule 1 checks whether the device supports Hash 
Function, Encryption, Secure Protocol, Encryption key bit size. If the Encryption key  bits 
size  is between 128 and 512, it categorize the device  as less likely to be affected by 
Spoofing.  
Rule 1:		
Device(?d)^	hasHash(?d,	?h)^	hasSecureProtocol(?d,	?p)^	hasEncryption(?d,	?e)^	
hasBitSize(?e,	?b)^swrlb:greaterThan(?b,	"128"^^xsd:int)^	swrlb:lessThan(?b,	"512"^^xsd:int)	->	
LowSpoofing(?d)		
Result: 
	
	
After running the reasoner, Smart_Electric_Meter is categorized as LowSpoofing device. The 
reason is that the device satisfies all the above requirements . The parameters of the device 
used are: 
Smart_Electric_Meter 
hasHash SHA-1 
hasSecureProtocol SSL 
hasEncryption AES 
hasBitSize 192 
	
Table	5:	Smart_Electric_Meter	Parameters	
 
Query 2: Display all users with their Roles 
 
SPARQL Query: 
 
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> 
PREFIX owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#> 
PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#> 
PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> 
PREFIX : <http://www.sgems.get/energys#> 
SELECT ?User ?Role 
 WHERE { ?User rdf:type :User. 
  ?User :hasRole ?Role.} 
Result: 
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As we can see from the result, User Hasi has a role as Producer1; whereas Getinet has 
HomeOwner role. 
Query 3: Display all users’ who has permission to read Smart Meter data with Role 
HomeOwner.  
 
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> 
PREFIX owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#> 
PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#> 
PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> 
PREFIX : <http://www.sgems.get/energys#> 
SELECT Distinct ?User ?Per 
 WHERE {?User rdf:type :User. 
  ?User :hasRole :HomeOwner. 
               ?Role :rolehasReadMeterDataPermission ?Per.} 
Result: 
 
 
The result shows, user Getinet has permission to read smart meter 
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Chapter	5	
5 Conclusion and Future Work 
5.1 Conclusion 
In the previous chapters, we reviewed the technologies in the smart Grid domain, and 
explained the proposed IoT security ontology, and described the implementation and the 
evaluation of the prototype built based on the proposed architecture. In this chapter, we 
summarize and conclude the main contribution of this thesis. Further, we also present the 
future research directions based on this work.  
5.2 Conclusion 
This research work proposed, developed and evaluated IoT Security ontology for smart home 
energy management. The Ontology description includes infrastructure, attacks, vulnerabilities 
and countermeasures of main components of SHEMS such as Smart Meter, Smart Appliance, 
Home Gateway, and Billing data. The ontology is built as an extension to SAREF energy 
management Ontology by adding Security features. We have two main reasons for selecting 
SAREF ontology for our work. First, SAREF is standardized by ETSI. Second, it is designed 
for energy management and efficiency. We checked the correctness of our Ontology by 
running SWRL rule and SPARQL query languages.  
5.3 Discussion  
This section discusses the summary of the achievements accomplished during the research 
work in the development of the Ontology. A detailed discussion advances different aspects as 
follows:  
5.3.1 Objectives Fulfillment  
The analysis, development and evaluation work of our ontology succeeded in the fulfillment 
of the initial objectives of this research which is defined in the first chapter. The first 
objective was to analyze the requirements of IoT security in Smart Energy Management 
System. Accordingly, we analyzed the main infrastructure, attacks and counter measures of 
Smart Home Energy management system from different scientific  papers. The second object 
was to review available ontologies related to IoT and Security. We reviewed Standardized 
Ontologies and Other Ontologies published in scientific journals. After we reviewed the 
ontologies, we compared them by using selected parameters. Based on our comparison result, 
we selected the best ontology for our goal and extended it in our work. 
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The other objective was to develop the ontology. The development of the ontology was done 
by following Ontology development guidelines. The ontology integrates the smart home 
energy management system and IoT security. We evaluated our ontology by running different 
security issue queries. 
5.3.2 Contribution  
The thesis work contributes to the practical knowledge that enables the precise integration of 
Smart Energy and IoT-based applications domains, as well as the development and validation 
of the ontology. The significance of our ontology includes:  
(1) Specific ontology for SHEM IoT-based application that can assist in assessing and 
predicting the vulnerabilities, possible attacks and possible countermeasures.  
(2) The users of the system have categorized according to their roles as consumers, producers, 
3rd party users, etc. 
(3) The Ontology gives specific focus for components in the SHEM domain.  
5.4 Future Work 
It would very interesting to apply our ontology to the multi metrics approach being developed 
in the IoTSec project. 
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